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1 Introduction
It is a longstanding philosophical idea that we form our perceptual beliefs (PBs) on the basis of
perceptual experiences (PEs), and that a PB can be justified by the corresponding PE. This proce-
dure corresponds to the first step of rational, or justified, belief acquisition. In a second step, we
use these PBs to justify all our other a posteriori beliefs. Concerning the second step, traditional
and formal epistemology and philosophy of science have progressed considerably in explaining
how we proceed rationally from observational data to theories about the world (Carnap 1950,
1971a,b; Hartman & Sprenger 2010; Leitgeb 2015; Popper 1935). Concerning the first step,
some progress has been achieved in traditional epistemology and in the philosophy of perception
(Evans 1982; Gaucker 2011; Heck 2000; Macpherson 2012, 2015; Peacocke 1992, 1998, 2001;
Pryor 2000; Siegel 2010; Stalnaker 1998). However, in formal epistemology virtually no progress
has been made concerning the first step, and indeed some of the published works present negative
results (Bradley 2015; White 2006). Only very recently have formal philosophers started to make
progress in this area, most of whom are working at the intersection of formal epistemology and
the philosophy of cognition (e.g., Douven & Decock 2014; Churchland 1992, 1998; Ga¨rdenfors
2000, 2014). The present paper investigates the first step of rational belief acquisition. Thus, it
focuses on justificatory relations between PEs and PBs, and between their contents, respectively.
In particular, the paper aims at outlining how it is possible to reason from the content of PEs to
the content of PBs. The paper approaches this aim by combining a formal epistemology perspec-
tive with an eye towards recent advances in the philosophy of cognition. Furthermore, the paper
restricts its focus, concentrating on the case of color perception and perceptual beliefs about color.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the state of the art concerning how to
reason from PEs to PBs and it draws a rather bleak picture. Starting from Section 3 we outline
a new approach concerning how to recast the traditional empiricist picture of the relation of PEs
and PBs in a new formal framework. The paper concentrates on the example of color perception
and beliefs about the color of objects. Thus, Section 3 discusses how to represent the content
of color perception and the content of corresponding beliefs—more specifically, the content of
PEs of color and the content of the main building block of our PBs about the color of objects,
i.e. color concepts. In particular, in subsection 3.1 it is argued that PEs have non-conceptual
content and that that non-conceptual content of color experience is best represented as points
in a phenomenal similarity space. Section 3.2 introduces Ga¨rdenfors’s idea to use geometrical
spaces to model the content of concepts as regions in that space. (Since we focus on the case of
color, we restrict ourselves to color space instead of using the full-blown apparatus of Ga¨rdenfors’s
Conceptual Spaces framework and we argue that an essential semantic aspect of perceptual color
concepts can be represented as regions in a phenomenal similarity space.) Section 4 outlines what
a rational relation between the non-conceptual content of PEs of color and the conceptual content
of PBs about color might look like. In particular, we define a rational degree of belief function
that shows how one could reason from such PEs to PBs about color. In Section 5 we conclude the
paper and outline the directions of future research.
2 The State of the Art
According to the traditional picture advocated by British and Logical Empiricists the following
three claims are correct: (i) The content of PBs is conceptual. (ii) The content of PEs is inde-
pendent of our beliefs, desires, and of our concepts or conceptual schemas (and independent
of all of cognition in general). Paraphrasing (ii) in modern terminology: the content of PE is
non-conceptual (Evans 1982; Heck 2000; Peacocke 2001) and cognitively impenetrable (Pylyshyn
1999). Finally, (iii) we form and we can justify our PBs (i.e., our empirically most basic beliefs)
on the basis of our PEs.1 This traditional idea is also very entrenched in the cognitive sciences.
1Indeed, some empiricists have even argued that in virtue of the independence of the non-conceptual content of PEs
and the conceptual content of beliefs in general and PBs in particular, PEs can serve as a secure fundament for justifying
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Focussing on visual perception, adopting terminology from Marr (1982) and following Pylyshyn
(1999), defenders of the traditional picture in cognitive science distinguish between, on the one
hand, early and cognition-independent visual processes and, on the other, late recognitional pro-
cesses essential only for categorization tasks that work on the basis of the output of early vision.
The output of early visual processes is thereby considered not to involve any conceptual represen-
tation and to be independent of cognition. Thus, according to this classical picture, the output of
early visual processes is non-conceptual and cognitively impenetrable. The output of late vision on
the other hand is considered to involve conceptual representation and therefore to be cognitively
penetrable to at least some extent. Among other things, the conceptual content of late perceptual
processes certainly depends on having the relevant concept in the first place.
This traditional picture possesses many features that epistemologists as well as—and especially—
cognitive scientists consider to be advantageous. From an epistemic point of view, this is an
attractive picture; one cognition-independent part of visual perception—i.e. what cognitive sci-
entists refer to as early vision—lies at the root of all recognition and categorization tasks. In
particular, traditional epistemologists like to think of the content of visual PEs as consisting of
the non-conceptual output of early vision and the conceptual output of late vision. Clearly, if
the non-conceptual content of visual PEs is cognitively impenetrable, then PEs could serve as an
epistemic foothold for the justification of vision-based beliefs with conceptual content. If it were
independent of cognition, no epistemic circularity worries (Siegel 2012; Lyon 2011) would have
to arise, and the non-conceptual content of visual PEs would be certain to be not theory-laden in
any interesting sense of the word (Kuhn 1962; Popper 1935; Raftopoulos 2009).
This picture is also attractive from a cognitive science perspective, given that it allows us to under-
stand visual processing as essentially encapsulated, which suggests a modular and, thus, relatively
simple architecture of the brain. According to the most simple picture, there is one module respon-
sible for early visual processing, and the output of this module is feedforwarded into brain areas
processing higher-level cognitive tasks such as recognitional and categorizational tasks. The al-
ternative would be to replace the standard picture of bottom-up processing from an encapsulated
visual module upwards to higher-order cognitive states by a more dynamic interplay between
higher-order cognitive states and lower-order perceptual states (the inputs to the senses being
the lowest state), which suggests a more cross-linked architecture and a continuous functioning
between perception and cognition.
Over the years this traditional picture has come under attack from various sides. On the one hand,
various epistemologists have argued against the picture from a purely philosophical perspective.
In particular, some follow Davidson in arguing that the non-conceptual, cognition-independent
content of PE cannot justify PBs, non-conceptual, cognition-independent content of PEs can only
cause them. Others hold that the content of PEs is purely conceptual and thus, is not completely
independent of cognition. Brewer (1999) and McDowell (1994), for example, are very explicit
about this. The main motivation for this view is the position that only the conceptual content
of PEs can be relevant for the justification of PBs and that such content is the only content of
philosophical relevance. According to these philosophers, all content of PEs can also be content
of beliefs (see Siegel 2015, §6). They thereby reject both Davidson’s (1986) idea that PEs only
cause PBs as well as the claim that only beliefs can justify beliefs—since for them, PEs can too.
(McDowell admits that PE might include non-conceptual content in the sense that it includes, for
example, picture-like images. However, since they are only causally relevant but not justificatorily
relevant, he considers that part of PE to have no content.)
Leaving behind the traditional picture, the best contemporary theories of the justification of PBs
rely on the conceptual content of PE to justify PBs (Pryor 2000, Siegel 2017).2 The basic idea is:
PBs. Here we ignore this strong variant of empiricism. We also only briefly address the empiricist claim that we learn our
first concepts on the basis of the non-conceptual content of PEs.
2For the moment we concentrate on internalist theories of justification. Externalist theories of justification that ascribe
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if an epistemic agent has the PE that p (e.g., this object is red), then her PB that p (i.e., this object
is red) is justified, prima facie. Given this approach, the most pressing question is: what concepts
can figure in PE? Can it only contain concepts such as RED, LOUD, SALTY, or can it also contain con-
cepts such as DIAMOND, CAR, HIGGS-BOSON, BREAKABLE, HAPPY? This question corresponds to the
question of whether the content of PE is thin or rich. That the content of PE is rich in the sense that
it includes highly complex or abstract conceptual content has been defended for the perception of
causal relations between events, of intentions of agents, of natural and artificial kinds, and for the
perception of a variety of aspects in the context of social cognition. (For a discussion of the thin vs.
rich content view of PE see, for example, Newen (2016), Siegel (2005, 2010), and Toribio (2015).)
On the other hand, a number of empirical findings since the 1940s suggest that PEs depend in
multifarious and relatively direct ways on higher-order cognitive processes such as beliefs and
desires, etc. First, psychological findings from the early “new look psychology” (as initiated in the
works of Brunner & Goodman (1947), Bruner & Postman (1947, 1949), and others) to contem-
porary results reported in Levin & Banaji (2006), Balcetics & Dunning (2010), Vetter & Newen
(2014), Lupyan (2012), Proffitt & Linkenauger (2013), and others, are taken to demonstrate the
influence of cognition on the non-conceptual content of PEs. (See Firestone & Scholl (2015) for
further references and critical discussion.)
Second, neuroscientific data shows that brain areas associated with higher-order cognitive pro-
cesses feed back into brain areas associated with early vision. Thus, in the light of our present
knowledge about the neurobiological structure of the brain, a more cross-linked architecture and
a continuous functioning between perception and cognition might be the more plausible picture.
For example Vetter & Newen 2014 refer to Salin & Bullier 1995 who show that “[t]he neuro-
physiological connections of the primary visual system with the rest of the brain are such that
there are much more feedback connections to primary visual cortex from higher cognitive areas
than feedforward connections to higher cognitive areas”, and according to Vetter and Newen this
strongly supports that cognitive penetration is possible and occurs frequently. In addition, Vetter
and Newen argue that the “time course of visual processes in V1 and V2 is such that we cannot
presuppose simple serial feedforward processing” from from early vision to late vision and thus
“our visual experience is not the product of a bottom-up encapsulated modular process but the
product of an embodied perception-expectation-action loop which is implemented for a cognitive
system by a highly flexible multiple integration of bottom-up and top-down processes” (Vetter &
Newen 2014: 66). Given these empirical findings, a modular structure of the brain no longer
holds the promise of providing a simpler model of the perception–cognition relation. To account
for early visual processing in terms of informationally encapsulated modules one may have to posit
not one but many such modules, each with its own set of functional input–output descriptions and
each with its own individual neurological implementation and complex and varying patterns of
interaction with other encapsulated modules. Thus, modular accounts of early visual processing
might appear simpler a priori, but given the empirical findings reported in Vetter & Newen 2014 it
is doubtful that they can live up to that promise. Whether these psychological and neuroscientific
findings already establish that there is an effect of cognitive processes on perception, and if so
whether it must be understood as cases of cognitive penetration, is of course hotly debated in the
literature (see, for example, Raftopoulus 2001 and Firestone & Scholl 2015).
Third, this traditional picture has also come under attack from certain theoretical approaches in
cognitive science. In particular, in the light of one recent theoretical approach in cognitive sci-
ence, i.e. the predictive processing or the predictive error minimization framework (Friston 2009,
Hohwy 2013, Clark 2013), one would rather expect that cognition alters PEs frequently and some-
times comprehensively. The framework suggests that perception is highly dependent on cognition
in general and beliefs and desires in particular. Accordingly, many cognitive scientists believe that
no relevant epistemic role to PE are briefly discussed later in the paper. Externalist theories often concentrate on the
process that leads to the PB: to the extent that it is reliable, the PB is justified whatever the content of the PE.
4
perception is cognitively penetrable.
There are two lines of defense that advocates of the traditional picture are building up. First, they
argue that not every causal influence reaching from cognition to perception counts as an instance
of cognitive penetration, because many of these influences do not invoke worries about epistemic
circularity or the charge that the content of PE is theory-laden. The idea is, if changes in the con-
tent of one’s PE are due to factors such as attention or the state of the perceptual system, etc., then
the mentioned circularity worries do not necessarily arise. They only arise if those changes have
been induced by the belief itself.3 Thus, many require a semantic or rational connection between
the content of cognition and the content of perception for cognitive penetration to hold. That such
a rational connection is necessary for cognitive penetration to hold has been convincingly argued
by Pylyshyn (1999) and very forcefully by Macpherson (2012). Pylyshyn writes:
[An] influence that . . . originates outside of the visual system and affects the content
of visual perception (what is seen) in a certain meaning-dependent way . . . we call
cognitive penetration. . . . [I]f a system is cognitively penetrable then the function
it computes is sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals and
beliefs, that is, it can be altered in a way that bears some logical relation to what the
person knows. (Pylyshyn 1999: 343)
Accordingly, if the content of PE is cognitively penetrable, then the content of PE is sensitive, in a
semantically coherent way, to the subject’s cognitive states such as desires and beliefs. The content
of that subject’s PE can be altered by altering the content of her beliefs and desires, and during all
those alterations there remains some logical, semantical or rational relation between the content
of the subject’s cognitive state and the content of that subject’s PEs.
A second line of defense of advocates of the traditional picture consists in doubting the suggested
interpretation of the empirical data. Defenders of the traditional picture argue against the psy-
chological data, claiming that these experiments and questionaries only demonstrate that there
is some influence on the conceptual content of PEs, respectively on content of the PBs. They do
not demonstrate that there is some influence on the non-conceptual content of PE. Against the
neuroscientific data they argue that we do not know how the output of early vision is influenced
by higher-order cognitive states. That there are many more feedback connections to the primary
visual cortex from higher cognitive areas than feedforward connections to higher-order cognitive
areas does not show that cognitive penetration takes place. The top-down feedback connections
from higher cognitive areas to primary visual experience might only be relevant for distributing
attention to certain perceptual states, and we have absolutely no idea whether and how they might
change the content of PE in a semantically coherent way. In particular, from the neuroscientific
data alone, we have no reason to expect that the content of PEs is theory-laden or that it is the
result of circular processing within the brain. Thus, they maintain the most plausible hypothesis
3The relation between attention and cognitive penetration is disputed in the literature. Obviously, changes in attention
or in the state of the perceptual system can lead to epistemic problems as highlighted by Stokes (2015). The question
is whether these epistemic problems are of a distinctively different form. According to philosophers such as Fodor and
Pylyshyn, they are. Changes in attention might lead to similar epistemic problems as directing your gaze or measuring
instrument in a different direction do, one can miss evidence. Changes in the state of the perceptual system might lead to
similar epistemic problems as using faulty or unclean measurement instruments, one can obtain false evidence. However,
they maintain that these epistemic problems are of a different form than the epistemic problems associated with theory-
ladenness of observation and cognitive penetration. Circularity worries seem to arise only in the latter two cases where your
theory, your belief, or respectively your language influences the content of perception experiences and perceptual beliefs.
However, Mole (2015) and Marchi (2017) argue that, depending on the theoretical assumptions about attention and
the cognitive system, attentional processes can be a contributing cause of cognitive penetration. For example, according
to Marchi (2017) in the predictive processing attention is associated with expectations of precision of the bottom-up
information. The lower the expectation of precision, i.e. the lower the attention, the greater the top-down influence. Thus,
it is low attention in the sense of the predictive processing literature, that enables higher-order beliefs to have a top-down
influence on lower-order PEs. Arguably, however, it is the content-dependence of PEs from beliefs that invokes our worry of
epistemic circularity. It is just the case that certain attentional processes are necessary for the worry of epistemic circularity
to arise.
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is still that the output of early vision is cognitively impenetrable.
Nevertheless, even if those two lines of defense hold, epistemologists and philosophers of cogni-
tion have navigated themselves into a tricky position. More specifically, even if the two lines of
defense hold this will not suffice for saving the justificatory role that we attribute to PE: neither
the non-conceptual content of PEs nor their conceptual content can be used for the justification
of PBs. Given the available empirical data, everyone seems to admit that the conceptual content
of PEs, i.e. the output of late vision-associated recognitional and categorization tasks, is probably
cognitively penetrated and, thus, ill-suited as an epistemic fundament for the justification of PBs.
Indeed the second line of defense admits that the available experiments and observations demon-
strate that there is some top-down influence on the conceptual content of PEs, respectively on the
content of the PBs and the respective judgments. What they aim at saving is the cognitive impen-
etrability of the output of early vision, i.e. the non-conceptual content. However, in opposition to
the traditional picture, epistemologists have also argued that only the conceptual content of PE is
relevant for justifying PB. The problem then is neither the conceptual nor the conceptual content
of PEs can serve as an epistemic fundament for justifying PBs. Attempts to tackle this challenge
are very rare, one noticeable exception being Siegel (2017).
In the following section, we lay the groundwork for a third line of defense. We outline a formal
theory of the non-conceptual content of PE and the content of PB to show that PBs can stand in
semantic or rational relations with the non-conceptual content of PEs. The outlined theory shows
that the non-conceptual content of PEs can serve as an epistemic fundament for the justification
of PBs if its content is sufficiently independent of the initial beliefs of the agent, i.e. if the first
and second lines of defense hold. In addition, this theory will also be relevant for investigating
whether the non-conceptual content of PE is sufficiently independent of cognition as suggested
by the second line of defense. As already argued, this question can only be answered when we
understand how far the non-conceptual content of PE can be influenced by the content of one’s
beliefs in virtue of the rational or semantic relations between them.
3 The Content of Color Experience and the Content of Color
Concepts
3.1 The Content of Color Experience
We want to advocate a picture according to which the content of PE includes non-conceptual con-
tent. The three most prominent reasons that are typically taken to support that PEs must include
non-conceptual content are introduced in the following.4
First, our discriminatory abilities seem to be more fine-grained than our ability to draw concep-
tual distinctions (e.g. following Evans 1982, see also Peacocke 2001). Consider, for example, our
ability to discriminate various shades of color. This discriminatory power can be best understood
by assuming that there is some non-conceptual content within our color experiences that allows
us to discriminate between different shades of green. After all, it seems plausible that we do not
have and also could not have a concept for each of these shades of green that we are able to dis-
tinguish. (Of course, once we admit the existence of non-conceptual content we can refer to the
non-conceptual content of PEs with the help of demonstrative concepts like ‘that shade of color’,
‘that form’, etc.)
Second, the content of PE is analog and not digital (see especially Goodman 1976 and Dretske
1981) (respectively, continuous and non-discrete). Colors, for example, can be more or less sat-
4They are prominently discussed in Evans 1982, Heck 2000, and Peacocke 2001. Macpherson (2015: 335-337) even
discusses six features of PEs that point towards non-conceptual content.
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urated and there is always a third color that is less saturated than the first and more saturated
than the second (if we presuppose that the two initial shades of color have a different degree of
saturation). The same seems to be true for the conditions of accuracy of PEs. The contents of
beliefs are true or false and, thus, they are not more or less accurate. In contrast to the content
of beliefs, the content of our PEs can be more or less accurate. If one perceives an object as being
two arms’ length away whereas it is actually three arms’ length away, then this PE is more accurate
than if one would have perceived it just as being just one arms’ length away. (Here, of course,
I assume that the representations which accuracy conditions are in question are not represented
conceptually, but non-conceptually.5)
Third, explaining the behavior of animals and pre-conceptual infants seems to require that we as-
sume that PEs (as well as other cognitive processes) include non-conceptual content. Bermudez
& Cahen (2015, §4.3), for example, argue to this effect. When one witnesses how animals react
in response to certain observational situations, then we have to admit that we cannot explain this
behavior without assuming that there is some content that is represented in the animal’s mind.
Since this content is, presumably, not conceptual, we have to assume it is non-conceptual; so the
argument goes. The ability of children to learn new perceptual concepts is another case in point.
If we want to understand learning concepts of infants, the traditional idea is the following: there
is some non-conceptual content given in PEs and children acquire their first concepts by learning
that PEs with very similar non-conceptual content are labeled with identical words. Especially em-
piricists embrace the idea that all or most of our concepts are learned via PEs. However, to explain
concept learning without presupposing prior acquaintance with concepts we have to assume that
there is some other content in PEs than conceptual content.
For the purpose of this paper, we presuppose that the above considerations demonstrate that PEs
have non-conceptual content. However, merely stating that PE include non-conceptual content
does not suffice for the purpose at hand: to show that we can reason rationally from PEs to
PBs. We need to say more about the structure of the non-conceptual content and how this con-
tent can be used to provide a theory of rational reasoning from PEs to PB. It has been suggested
that the non-conceptual content of PE can be understood in terms of sets of (centered) possible
worlds (Stalnaker 1998) or as “scenario content” (Peacocke 1992). Peacocke’s idea is that the
non-conceptual content conveys geometrical information about the scenario around us. He insists
that his account is an account of the content of PE itself in contrast to the content of PE as expe-
rienced by the agent. He writes: “I should also emphasize that the positioned scenario content is
literally meant to be the content itself. It is to be distinguished from any mental representation of
that content” (Peacocke 1992: 66). Thus, neither account helps us to describe the non-conceptual
content of a specific PE as phenomenally experienced by the agent, nor describes how the agent
processes that content. In both cases, agents do not have epistemic access to the non-conceptual
content of PE (neither consciously nor unconsciously) for this we would need to know how that
content is mentally represented. In the following we provide such an account.
Psychologists and cognitive scientists assume quite readily that there is non-conceptual content
within PE and they provide formal models for this content. While philosophers commonly con-
centrate on the relationship between the PE and what it represents in the external world (in close
analogy to philosophy of language, where extensional semantics dominate), psychologists and
cognitive scientists focus on the content of PE as phenomenally experienced by the subject (in
close analogy to intentional semantics). More specifically, when psychologists and cognitive scien-
tists want to model the variety of possible phenomenal experiences a subject can experience, they
often refer to phenomenal similarity spaces. For example, the color space represents the shades
of colors a subject can experience: it represents shades of color with the help of a geometrical
5There also might be a conceptual representation of distance. Firestone and Scholl (2015), for example, defend the
cognitively impenetrability thesis in the context of tasks involving the evaluation of distanc, by admitting that perceptual
judgments of distance, respectively PBs in our terminology, can be top-down influenced. The non-conceptual content of
PEs concerning distance, they maintain, are cognitively impenetrable.
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space and the distance between points in that space is interpreted as representing the dissimilarity
between two shades of color.
Example: the Phenomenal Color Space
The three quality dimensions of color perception:
• hue (red, yellow, green, blue, pink, and red again)
• brightness (white, gray, black)
• chromaticness/saturation (colored, gray)
• every perceivable color is a point in the three di-
mensional color space.
The idea is that within that color space we can represent shades of color as points in the space.
Every point in that space specifies the hue of the color, its brightness and its saturation. Every
other color shade differs from the first in at least one of these respects. According to this idea,
the non-conceptual content of our PE of color can be represented by a point in the color space.
Such a representation of the shade of color has the advantage that the content of color percep-
tion can indeed be said to be analog or continuous instead of being digital or discrete. The above
color space, the CIE-LAB 1976 color space model, is informed by empirical investigations into how
humans perceive color and how the cones on the retina are influenced by light of different wave
lengths.6
Representing shades of color as points in some color space seems to be appropriate and in line
with the state of the art in psychology and cognitive science. Indeed, the empirical research in this
area of research does not question this; rather, it concentrates exclusively on the question of which
space is the most suitable one for representing color appearance. By following this proposal we can
also explain the above three observations that prompted philosophers to argue that there is non-
conceptual content within PE. The continuous color space can account for the fine-grainedness
of our discriminatory abilities of color if compared to our ability to draw conceptual distinctions
based on color concepts. (It can even account for the vagueness associated with borderline cases
of specific color concepts. Here the concept of a border is not just used in a metaphorical sense.
The relevant literature is the following: Douven et al. 2013.) Of course, this representation of
color can also account for why we characterize the content of PEs as analog or continuous, since
it represents shades of color as points in a continuous space. Finally, we can use this represen-
tation of color experiences for explaining the behavior of animals and infants.7 In principle, this
approach also offers enough resources to explain how children learn color concepts in the first
place (omitted for blind review).
One possible objection needs to be addressed. If we express the content of color perception by
stating that an object o is presented to us in PE as having the color 〈x, y, z〉 in the color space
(short: c(o) = 〈x, y, z〉), we seem to express a proposition which is true or false. Thus, one might
object that the content of such an expression is digital or discrete and not analog or continuous as
required for non-conceptual content of PE. Therefore, the content expressed is conceptual and not
non-conceptual. This predicament is due to the fact that for expressing the non-conceptual content
6The best color appearance models nowadays use more than three dimensions to represent color as experienced by
humans, and thus it is less than ideal to represent them pictorially. The CIE-CAM02 model uses the dimensions brightness
(luminance), lightness, colorfulness, chroma, hue and saturation (where saturation could be understood as a dependent
dimension that does not need to be added to the model). For the purpose of the paper, it is not important in which space we
represent color experiences, it only matters that there is such a space and that we can represent a specific color experience
as a point in that space.
7In biology we need to use different phenomenal color spaces for different species to explain their behavior (sometimes
they might even differ within species).
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of color perception we need to rely on concepts. Using concepts to express the present account of
non-conceptual content cannot be circumvented. We need another way to cash out the idea that
c(o) = 〈x, y, z〉 expresses the non-conceptual content of color perception. We propose that we help
ourselves by restricting how we can use these expressions in order to express the non-conceptual
content of color perception. In particular, we suggest that the following content cannot be the
outcome of a PE of color: c(o) 6= 〈x, y, z〉 and c(o1) = 〈x1, y1, z1〉∧ (or ∨) c(o2) = 〈x2, y2, z2〉. Given
these restrictions it is reasonable to say that c(o) = 〈x, y, z〉 expresses the analog or continuous
content of color perception. The discussion of to what extend this approach can be generalized
for all aspects of visual experience such as the shape and location of objects, the view point of the
observer and the illumination of the whole scene will be take up again in the final section of this
paper.
3.2 The Content of Color Concepts
In this subsection we outline our account of the conceptual content of PBs concerning color. The
conceptual content of PBs (and possibly of PEs if they possess conceptual content) should enable
us to elaborate a rational relation between the non-conceptual content of PE and the conceptual
content of PBs, in order to proceed rationally from PEs to PBs. In order to reach this goal we fol-
low Ga¨rdenfors and understand concepts as being associated with certain regions in a conceptual
space. Conceptual spaces are geometrical spaces and their geometrical structure is used to capture
semantical properties and relations. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to phenomenal similarity
spaces instead of using the full-blown apparatus of Ga¨rdenfors’s Conceptual Spaces framework.
The dimensions in the phenomenal similarity space represents respects in which objects can be
experienced as similar or dissimilar and distances between points in the space represent the phe-
nomenal similarity of objects within the space. With this restriction to phenomenal similarity
spaces comes the confinement that we only aim at modelling the content of perceptual concepts,
respectively the perceptual aspects of a given concept. We do not want to take any stance on the
question of whether all semantic aspects of a given concept can be represented within the concep-
tual spaces framework.
In more detail, the idea is the following. Let us refer to those concepts that can figure in PBs
(and possibly PEs) as perceptual concepts. One main purpose of perceptual concepts is to allow
for the categorization of objects in a few linguistic categories on the basis of our manifold PEs of
those objects. For example, the color concept VIOLET allows one to categorize objects according
to their manifold shades of color as experienced by the agent. With the help of such concepts, we
achieve two goals. First, these perceptual concepts can be understood as coming with what has
been called ‘language entry rules’ (Putnam 1981: 11). They allow us to introduce a concept or
a word for a given object on the basis of a non-conceptual fundament; thus, perceptual concepts
enable us to climb the first step of rational belief acquisition. For example, the perceptual concept
VIOLET enables us on basis of our PE to introduce the PB that the object is violet. Second, such
concepts also allow us to group similar shades of color together by subsuming them under one
concept or category. For example, the concept VIOLET subsumes various different shades of color
under one label and delimits them from various other shades of color. Given this job description,
it is only natural to understand the concept VIOLET as corresponding, at least in part, to a region in
the phenomenal similarity space. This region then includes all those manifold points in the space
that we want to group in one category under one label and it thereby delimits these points in
the space from other points in the space that lie outside of the relevant region in the phenomenal
similarity space. Schematically, we can depict this as follows:
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white
black
blue
violet
red
green yellow
The color term ‘violet’ (as used in the English language) is associated with the concept VIOLET which can be understood
as corresponding to one specific region in the color space. (As already said, at least in part it should correspond to such a
region. The whole concept might also be identified via its relations to other concepts.)
A first advantage of this approach to capturing the content of perceptual concepts is that it is
simple and natural to integrate prototype semantics within that framework. In particular, various
empirical findings suggest that objects instantiating a perceptual concept can be more or less rep-
resentative of the category. For example, robins are more representative of the category BIRD than
eagles, ravens and many other birds (Rosch 1975,1978; Mervis & Rosch 1981). Certain shades
of violet are more prototypical than others. Similar prototypical effects have been shown to exist
for various kinds of concepts. Within the present framework these effects can be modeled with
the help of the geometric properties of the phenomenal similarity space. The main idea is the
following: a given perceptual concept can be understood as a region in a phenomenal similarity
space, and our prototype for that concept can be understood as a point or a prototypical region at
the center of the region of that concept.
A second advantage is that we can understand how the non-conceptual content of PE can serve
as a fundament for acquiring concepts in the first place. First, children have manifold PEs of
the objects around them, and from competent speakers of the language they learn to draw the
same boundaries (respectively sufficiently similar boundaries) between points in the phenomenal
similarity space. Only when they learned distinguishing shades of violet from shades of blue,
red, yellow, etc., for example, do we say that they have mastered the concept VIOLET. Of course,
we still need to explain how exactly children learn their first concepts on the basis of the non-
conceptual content of PE. Ga¨rdenfors (2000) shows that we can use geometrical spaces and the
idea of prototypes to explain concept acquisition. (omitted for blind review) offer an alternative
account, according to which children use a quasi-Bayesian reasoning process to acquire concepts.
For the purpose of the paper, the details of those accounts are not important. What is important
is that the present approach allows us to frame various different theories about how children
can acquire first concepts from the non-conceptual content of PE without presupposing that they
already possess perceptual concepts. This provides additional support for the present proposals for
understanding perceptual concepts and the content of PE. In particular, it shows that the present
proposal is preferable to alternative proposals that do not display the potential to account for
concept learning in the indicated way.
4 A Rational Relation Between PE and PB
In the following we outline how the non-conceptual content of PE can stand in rational relations
with the conceptual content of PB; we do so by focusing on color perception and beliefs about
color.
The challenge is to specify in precise formal terms under which conditions it is rational to form a
belief about the color of an object on the basis of one’s color experience of that object. In order to
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meet this challenge, let us briefly discuss the standard theory of rational reasoning within episte-
mology and cognitive science: Bayesianism.
Since the beginning of analytic philosophy, scientific philosophers and philosophical scientists such
as de Finetti (1937), Keynes (1921), von Mises (1931), and Ramsey (1926) have argued that the
foundations of rational reasoning are best captured in terms of probabilities. The reason for this
is simple: the Bayesian approach to understanding the foundations of rational reasoning in terms
of probability is the most intuitive and comprehensive approach to such an enormous challenge.
Strevens (2008) summarizes the advantages of the Bayesian approach:
The popularity of the Bayesian approach is due to its flexibility, its apparently effortless
handling of various technical problems, the existence of various a priori arguments for
its validity, and its injection of subjective and contextual elements into the process of
[rational reasoning] in just the places where critics of earlier approaches had come to
think that subjectivity and sensitivity to context were necessary. (Strevens 2008: 5)
As indicated by Strevens, there are many a priori arguments for Bayesianism, from the so-called
Dutch book argument by Ramsey (1926) over the calibration argument by van Fraassen (1983)
to the accuracy argument by Joyce (1999) and Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010a,b). These arguments
have lead to an almost universal acceptance of Bayesianism by those philosophers and psycholo-
gists (and economists and scientists) who employ formal tools to understand and model rational
reasoning.
The application of the Bayesian framework has proven to be extremely fruitful in cognitive sci-
ence, too. In particular, it has been applied to the problem of perception and categorisation and
the problem of sensory coding and processing. The idea that perception should be understood
as being inferential is often traced back to Helmholtz. Already Helmholtz used probabilities to
model the nature of the unconscious inferential processes underlying perception and categoriza-
tion. Contemporary approaches in psychology and neuroscience to model perception are discussed
extensively in Knill and Richardson (1996) and Rao, Olshausen & Lewicki (2002). The more gen-
eral Bayesian brain hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that in general (not just in perception) the
brain codes and processes as if it were employing Bayesian methods or models, is discussed by
philosophers of cognition and neuroscientists too, e.g. Colombo & Serie`s (2012), Knill & Pouget
(2004), Friston (2009) and Hohwy (2013).
According to the Bayesian norms of reasoning as they are understood in epistemology, an agent’s
degrees of belief should obey the axioms of probability and the agent should update these degrees
of belief in the light of new evidence by using Bayes’s Rule.8 The axioms of probability theory
state the following:9
Axioms of Probability. Let W be a set of possibilities (e.g. possible worlds) and let A be an
algebra of subsets over the set W of possibilities. A function Pr : A → R is a probability function
on A if and only if for all A, B ∈ A:
1. Pr(A) ≥ 0
2. If A =W , then Pr(A) = 1
3. Pr(A ∪B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B), if (A ∩B) = ∅
8For the purpose of this paper, we ignore the update method of Jeffrey conditionalization.
9Especially for philosophical applications, the notions of conditional probabilities play an important role. Thus, the
above definition of probabilities needs to be supplemented by a definition of conditional probabilities.
Definition. If Pr(B) > 0, then Pr(A|B) = Pr(A ∩B)/Pr(B)
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Then Bayes’s Rule states how an agent should update her degrees of belief in the light of new
evidence.
Bayes’s Rule. If Pr is the agent’s probability function at time point t0, E is the logically strongest
proposition that the agent became absolutely certain of between time points t0 and t1, and
Pr(E) > 0, the agent’s probability function after learning E should change to PrE , which is
defined as follows:
Pr
E
(H) = Pr(H|E)
for all H ∈ A.
The problem for the present purpose is that in epistemology the elements of the algebra are
typically interpreted as propositions that are either true or false. Thus, a proposition A is best un-
derstood as a binary propositional variable that can take on the values 1 or 0. The non-conceptual
content of color experience, however, has been said to be continuous or analog and, thus, is best
understood as a continuous random variable. As we recall, color experiences can be represented
as points 〈x, y, z〉 in the color space. Color concepts, on the other hand, can be represented as
regions in a space and they can be understood as binary random variables that take on the value
1 if the relevant object’s shade of color falls under the given color concept and 0 otherwise.
It is possible to define probabilities for continuous random variables, and in the following we will
introduce this machinery directly for the three dimensions of color perception.
Probabilities and Color Perception. Let X ,Y,Z be the continuous random variables associated
with the dimensions of color perception and which can take on values x, y, and z in R. Then Pr :
C → R is a probability function on C whose elements are the color concepts if and only if for all color
concepts C ⊆ X × Y × Z:
Pr
(
c(o) ∈ C) = ∫
C
fX ,Y,Z(〈x, y, z〉) dx, dy,dz
where f(〈x, y, z〉) is the joint probability density function such that f(〈x, y, z〉) ≥ 0 and∫
X×Y×Zf(〈x, y, z〉) dx, dy,dz = 1
This gives us the basis for understanding how one can reason rationally from the content of PE of
color to the PB about the color of objects.10 In particular, it shows how one can directly infer a
belief about color from the content of perception. In our visual experiences, object o is represented
as having the color 〈x, y, z〉 in color space. In cognition, the concept VIOLET corresponds to a region
in color space that does or does not include the point 〈x, y, z〉. Based on the probability, we then
can infer (from visual experience to belief) that object o is violet.
Pr
(
c(o) ∈ VIOLET | c(o) = 〈x, y, z〉) = {1 if 〈x, y, z〉 ∈ VIOLET
0 if 〈x, y, z〉 /∈ VIOLET
This formal theory accomplishes what we philosophers have sought after: it connects the non-
conceptual content of PEs with the conceptual content of PBs in a rational way. Of course, this
picture of the rational relation between the content of color perception and beliefs about color
involves many idealizations, and a satisfactory theory of the rational relations between perception
and belief has to overcome these idealizations. Indeed, overcoming these idealizations is the first
topic we have to address when we discuss the directions of future research as regards the present
approach.
10The relevant definition of conditional probabilities is a little bit more complicated.
Definition. Pr
(
A|c(o) = 〈x, y, z〉) = r iff Pr(A ∧ c(o) = 〈x, y, z〉) = ∫CfX ,Y,Z(〈x, y, z〉)× r dx, dy,dz
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5 Directions of Future Research
There are three important directions that future research concerning the approach presented here
should explore. In the following we want to outline them and indicate the results that we can
expect from such research endeavors. The first direction concerns the idealizations involved in
the theory as it is presented so far. The aim must be to get rid of some of these idealizations.
The second direction that future research should explore concerns the question of how one can
generalize the present approach so that it is suitable for modeling the content of PE in general:
the content of visual experiences as well the content of PE that originates from other sense modal-
ities. The third direction should aim to put the present approach to work. The aim is to solve
the important problems in epistemology and philosophy of cognition that motivated elaborating
theories of non-conceptual content in the first place.
Let us begin with the idealizations within the approach as presented so far. First, the present
approach assumes that the agent fully relies on her color perception and its rational relation with
one’s color concepts. Of course, this presupposition is often not satisfied. For example, suppose
you are invited to a party and you see the suit of the party host only very briefly, perhaps for one
second. Here you might not have gotten a clear and precise PE of the color of the suit and, thus,
you might not be sure what PE you did have. Modeling this kind of uncertainty about the content
of one’s PE of color is possible. One can introduce second-order probabilities or rely on Jeffrey
conditionalization properly formalized for continuous random variables. The relevant machinery
is already introduced and discussed in detail in Skyrms (1980). Applying these formal tools to the
presented theory of the non-conceptual content of PE seems to be appropriate and promising.
Another and slightly different example hints at a second kind of idealization: suppose you see the
suit of the host in dim lighting conditions. It is hard to decide whether you should believe that
the suit is dark blue or black, even though you have a clear and precise PE of the color of the
suit. This example suggests that we should distinguish the concepts LOOKING BLACK and BEING
BLACK. Given the PE you are justified to believe that the suit looks black in this example, but you
are perhaps not justified to believe that it is black. (Indeed, given suitable background knowledge
you might even be justified in believing that it is blue despite your PE of a black suit, e.g., if you
have been told that the host will be wearing a dark blue suit.) Here the aim should be to provide
a more realistic theory of the relation between the content of one’s PEs and the content of PBs one
is justified in entertaining in the light of the PE. For this purpose one must also model the content
of one’s PE of the lighting conditions, and only together with the content of your PE of the color
of the suit are you justified in forming a PB about the color of the suit.
The third idealization involved in the examples is the assumption that the perceived shade of color
is not a borderline case. Suppose you have a clear and precise PE of the color of the suit and you
know that the lighting conditions are ideal for coming to a judgement about the color of the suit,
but then you recognize that even given those ideal conditions you cannot form a PB about the
color of the suit. This can happen if the perceived shade of color is a borderline case between
blue and black. If we were dealing with a borderline color shade for the given color term, then
assigning probability 1 or 0 to the relevant proposition would be inadequate. An approach for
dealing with this problem is characterized in Decock & Douven (2014). In their paper they use
conceptual spaces to model a graded membership relation, and the idea is to adjust the probabili-
ties accordingly.
Now let us address the prospects for generalizing the presented approach to encompass all non-
conceptual content of PE. The question is whether the content of PE in general can be represented
by points in some geometric space. Previous work in the area of vision has been championed by
David Marr (1982). According to Marr, all aspects of vision can be modeled geometrically. He
writes:
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There are four main factors responsible for the intensity values in an image. They are (1) the
geometry and (2) the reflectances of the visible surfaces, (3) the illumination of the scene,
and (4) the viewpoint. In an image, all these factors are muddled up, some intensity changes
being due to one cause, others to another, and some to a combination. The purpose of early
visual processing is to sort out which changes are due to what factors and hence to create
representations in which the four factors are separated. (Marr 1982: 41)
For all these four factors of a visual picture, Marr maintains that they can be represented as
points in a complex geometric space. Churchland (1992, 1998), Gauker (2011) and especially
Ga¨rdenfors (2000, 2014) have made further significant advances to explain the various features
of perception. They argue that we should explain these features by modeling the content of PEs in
terms of similarity spaces. In addition, cognitive scientists have proposed phenomenal similarity
spaces for sound, taste, and also the shape and movements of objects. (To my knowledge no one
has yet proposed a geometric model for the non-conceptual content of PE of smell.) Thus, it is in-
deed a promising approach to model the non-conceptual content of PE in general with the help of
geometric spaces. If this is so, then it is also promising to model one aspect of perceptual concepts
as regions in the phenomenal similarity space. This way these concepts can function as language
entry rules as envisioned by Putnam (1981). That these language entry rules can be understood
in analogy to rational inference rules has been shown in the previous sections.
The final direction of future research that we want to address here is the application of the present
theory to various philosophical problems in epistemology and the philosophy of cognition that mo-
tivated theories of non-conceptual content of PE in the first place. We have already discussed in
some detail the traditional empiricist picture according to which one can justify PBs with the help
of the non-conceptual content of PE. Another perhaps even more interesting application, which we
already discussed in section three, is the possibility to provide a theory of concept learning from
non-conceptual content of PE alone. This idea has been discussed in philosophy at least since the
British empiricists and with the theory of the non-conceptual content of PE presented here it seems
possible to overcome the challenges associated with it. If we associate a perceptual concept with
the ability to categorize objects on the basis of our PE, we have to explain how pre-conceptual
children acquire the ability to subsume different but similar objects under the same label. The key
idea (pursued in Ga¨rdenfors 2000, 2014; omitted for blind review) is to formulate the respective
theory in terms of the similarity of the PE of those objects.
A further important and interesting application of the presented theory concerns the topic of
cognitive penetration. As we recall, many epistemologists require that there is a semantic or
rational relation between the content of the influencing belief and the influenced PE. For the
sake of the presentation of the main idea of our approach we assume that the following is a case
of cognitive penetration. (In our description of these empirical findings we follow Macpherson
2012.) Levin & Banaji (2006) studied the misperception of the lightness of faces due to the
agent’s beliefs. In particular, they report that
“[w]hite faces were consistently judged to be relatively lighter than Black faces, even
for racially ambiguous faces that were disambiguated by labels. Accordingly, relatively
abstract expectations about the relative reflectance of objects can affect their perceived
lightness.” (Levin & Banaji 2006, abstract)
One of the experiments (Experiment 2) was designed as follows: First, three faces were con-
structed: one unambiguous Black face (B), one unambiguous White face (W), and one ambiguous
face.
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tions, when the adjustable face and the reference face are identical?
The most likely explanation is that the lightness of the adjustable
face is perceived more objectively because it is not static, and
subjects see it change as they adjust it. Therefore, the distortion is
relatively stronger in the reference face because its shading is
perceived as being more integral to the identity of that object. For
example, when subjects adjust the Black face to match a reference
copy of the same face, they might perceive the reference face as 5
levels darker than it is, whereas they perceive the adjustable face
more objectively, perhaps seeing it as only 2.5 levels darker than
it actually is. Thus, to match the two, they will need to darken the
more objectively perceived adjustable face to match the darker
appearing reference face. This is particularly interesting because it
suggests that subjects perceive properties that they can easily
manipulate as less inherently bound to the stimulus they are
associated with. However, we reserve further exploration of this
question for future studies.
One benefit of the presence of the same-race distortion effect is
that it helps reduce the plausibility of a particularly troublesome
alternative hypothesis about the cause of the effect we have ob-
served here. Perhaps subjects adjust Black faces to be relatively
darker not because the faces are globally perceived as darker but
rather because they tend to focus their attention on relatively light
parts of Black faces, whereas they focus their attention on rela-
tively dark parts of White faces. For example, assuming that noses
tend to be light (because they protrude from the face) and eye
sockets tend to be dark (because they are concave), it would be
problematic if subjects tend to focus on the relatively light noses of
Black faces whereas they focus on the relatively dark eyes of
White faces. Accordingly, subjects might adjust a Black face to be
too dark because they are trying to darken a nose that is inherently
lighter than the eyes they are looking at in the White face. How-
ever, this is not a problem with a pair of identical faces if it is
assumed that subjects focus on the same parts of the faces when
comparing two faces from the same group, and hence we do not
have to contend with this possibility.
Although a selective attention explanation for the darkness
effect seems unlikely, it is still possible that some sort of stimulus
artifact causes the effect. Such a hypothesis turns on the possibility
that some incidental property of the specific faces we used might
make them seem relatively dark or light. For example, if the shape
of the eyes in the White face happens to make them appear dark,
then subjects will lighten the face artificially. We therefore de-
signed Experiment 2 to avoid this problem by creating a face that
was racially ambiguous and having subjects judge it in the context
of other unambiguous faces. Accordingly, for half of the subjects,
the ambiguous face was labeled Black and presented in the context
of unambiguous White faces; for the other half, the same face was
labeled White and presented in the context of unambiguous Black
faces. If subjects match the ambiguous face with a dark standard
when they believe it is Black and match it with a lighter standard
when they believe it is White, then the effect is probably not bound
to the stimulus.
In addition to using ambiguous faces in Experiment 2, we made
several other changes to the experiment. Most important, instead
of having subjects adjust one face to match another, we asked
subjects to adjust the lightness of a square gray region to match a
face. This was necessary because in the two-face procedure, it is
not completely clear which of the two faces (reference or adjust-
able) is being distorted. Although we argued above that the refer-
ence face is more likely to be distorted, we cannot with confidence
rule out the possibility there is some distortion in the adjustable
face. This is problematic if we intend to isolate the distortion effect
to an ambiguous reference face.
Experiment 2: Removing Stimulus Artifacts
Method
Subjects. A total of 27 Kent State University undergraduates com-
pleted Experiment 2 in exchange for credit in their General Psychology
course. Of these, 24 indicated that they were women, 24 indicated that they
were White or Caucasian, and 3 indicated that they were Black or African
American. Subjects’ mean age was 18.8 years (range 18–30 years). Thir-
teen subjects completed the B/BW condition (in which an ambiguous face
was paired with an unambiguous Black face), and 14 completed the BW/W
condition (in which an ambiguous face was paired with an unambiguous
White face).
Apparatus. The apparatus was identical to that used in Experiment 1.
Stimuli. In addition to the Black and White average faces used in
Experiment 1, an ambiguous face was created (Figure 4). This was done by
first creating a continuum of 21 faces between the Black average and the
White average in 5% increments. Then, a group of 15 pilot subjects
classified each of the faces by race. In this classification experiment,
subjects viewed each of the 21 faces a total of 4 times in random order and
were instructed to hit one key if they thought the face was White and
another if they thought it was Black. On the basis of these classifications,
the most ambiguous face was the intermediate face that represented a 50-50
blend of Black and White. These distortions represented very close
matches with the respective Black and White unambiguous face
distortions.
Procedure. Procedures were similar to those used in Experiment 1,
with several exceptions. First, for half of the subjects, the ambiguous face
replaced the Black face, and, for the other half, the same face replaced the
White face. Before beginning the task, all subjects saw an instruction
screen that included the ambiguous face next to one of the unambiguous
faces underneath the labels Black and White. Subjects in the BW/W
condition saw the ambiguous (BW) face paired with the White face, and
therefore the BW face was labeled Black. In contrast, subjects in the B/BW
condition saw the same ambiguous face labeled White and paired with the
unambiguous Black face. Otherwise the instruction screens were the same
as in Experiment 1.
On each trial, instead of presenting two faces, we presented only one
face adjacent to an adjustable gray region. The region was rectangular and
filled with a uniform gray shade. It measured 80 (horizontal) ! 100
(vertical) pixels. The starting gray levels of this region were matched to the
mean starting gray levels of the original adjustable faces from Experiment
1, and they were adjusted during each trial using the same procedure as in
Experiment 1.
Figure 4. The ambiguous face.
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Second, “all subjects saw an instruction screen that includ d the ambiguous face next to one of
the unambiguous faces underneath the labels Black and White. Subjects in the BW/W condition
saw the ambiguous (BW) face paired with the White face, and therefore the BW face was labeled
Black. In contrast, subjects in the B/BW condition saw the same ambiguous face labeled White
and paired with the unambiguous Black face.” Finally, on each trial, participants were presented
with one face adjacent to an adjustable gray region and they were asked to match the lightness of
the adjustable gray region to lightness of the displayed face. The interesting result was that the
participants “chose darker samples for Black faces than for White faces and, in this case, chose
a darker standard for the ambiguous face when it was labeled Black” than when it was labelled
white. For Macpherson (2012), this is a clear case of cognitive penetration: our belief that the
ambiguous face is White, respectively Black, influences our perception of the lightness of the face.
If the label ‘Black’ induces in us the the belief that the ambiguous face is a Black person, then we
perceive that face as darker than if the label ‘White’ induces in us the belief that the ambiguous
face is a White person. Yet, if we follow traditional epistemologists then there is no semantic or
rational relation between the content of the PE of the grayness of the face and one’s belief that one
sees a black person. There cannot be such a relation because the content of the belief is conceptual
but the content of PE is not conceptual. However, the presented theory has the potential to account
for the rational relation between the content of the belief and the content of the color experience.
The concept BLACK FACE is associated with a region in the color space that includes darker shades
if one compares it with the region in the color space that is associated with the concept WHITE
FACE. Thus, in this case of top-down influence from beliefs to PE, the relevant criterion seems to
be satisfied. The influence that “originates outside of the visual system and affects the content
of visual perception (what is seen) in a certain meaning-dependent way” is a case of cognitive
penetration. It is a case of cognitive penetration because the “function it computes is sensitive,
in a semantically coherent way, to the [. . . agent’s] beliefs, that is, it can be altered in a way that
bears some logical relation to what the person knows (Pylyshyn 1999: 343).
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